We study the existence of equilibrium price vector in a supply-demand model taking into account the transaction costs associated with the sale of products. In this model, the demand function is the solution to the problem of maximizing the utility function under budget constraints. The supply function is the solution to the problem of maximizing the profit (with given transaction losses) on the technology set. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium price vector, which are consequences of some theorems in the theory of covering mappings.
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INTRODUCTION
The existence of equilibrium is still one of the most important questions in the study of economic models.
The concept of economic equilibrium was first formulated by Leon Walras [1] . He established a law, that implies the equality of the number of equilibrium prices and the number of equations to which they satisfy. However, he did not prove the existence of equilibrium due to lack of mathematical apparatus, which appeared later on, and included the Brouwer fixed-point theorem, Kakutani fixedpoint theorem, Gale-Nikaido-Debreu lemma, Ky Fan inequality, etc. This made it possible to investigate the conditions of the existence of equilibrium in some economic models.
One of the first results about the conditions of the existence of the competitive equilibrium was obtained in 1954 by Arrow and Debreu [2] . Further development of the theory, taking into account the role of the credit and financial instrument, allowed to investigate the conditions of the existence of the equilibrium in models of economic dynamics; see, e.g., Aliprantis et al. [3] and Hildenbrand et al. [4] .
However, these results are not applicable for studying models with transaction costs, where the price a consumer pays exceeds the price a producer pays. Transaction costs may have different origins: inflation of production costs, tax on sales, racket, etc. Adapting the concept of the economic equilibrium for models with the transaction costs has led to modification of the basic constructions of mathematical economics and to developement of the theory of non-classical equilibriums; see, e.g., Pospelov [5] and Petrov et al. [6] .
In [7] , [8] the existence of non-classical equilibriums has been reduced to the existence of solutions of special variational inequalities. However, such inequalities do not satisfy the Walras law, whence the standard approach to proving the existence of their solutions (based on the Gale-Nikaido-Debreu lemma) is not applicable. According to our knowledge, none of well-known papers contain any sufficient conditions of the existence of equilibriums in economic models with transaction costs. This is related to the fact that the existing mathematical apparatus is not sufficient for solving this problem.
In this paper, we present a solution to this problem based on [7] - [9] , devoted to the existence of coincidence points of mappings in metric spaces. Using the results and methods developed in these papers, we obtain constructive sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibriums in economic models with transaction costs. Here we consider the vector of equilibrium prices as a coincidence point of two mappings: the demand and supply functions. These functions are considered as mappings X → Y , where X, Y are subsets of finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces, whence X, Y are metric spaces with metrics induced by the ambient Euclidean spaces. The methods we use are based on the theory of coincidence points for Lipschitz continuous and covering mappings, developed in a series of recent papers, see, e.g., [7] - [9] .
CONSUMER AND PRODUCER BEHAVIOR MODEL THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FUNCTIONS
Suppose that there are n ∈ N goods with the price vectors
where p i is the price of the ith good for the consumer andp i is the price of the ith good for the producer. Assume thatp = Ap, where A = diag {α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n }, 0 < α i < 1. This relation holds true, for instance, if the producer pays sales tax, or in some economic models with high inflation; see e.g., Petrov et al. [6] . Production capacity of the producer is described by the technology set
where ϕ : R 2n + → R is a strongly convex C 2 -smooth function and
are the vector of inputs and the vector of outputs, respectively. Here y +i ∈ R + is the gross output of the ith good, y −i ∈ R + is the quantity of the ith good needed for y + . The producer's goal is to maximize his profit, that is, to solve the following extremum problem:
where the triangle brackets denote the standard dot product in R n . Then, taking into account the assumptions above, the extremum problem (1) can be written in the form
Here and below, to write y ≥ 0 means that all components of the vector y are non-negative.
Let y * = (y * + , y * − ) be a solution of the extremum problem (2) . Then the producer's supply is presented by the mapping
Assume that the consumer possesses the budget I(p), and his preferences are presented by the utility function u : R n + → R, which is C 2 -smooth, strictly concave (i.e., the function −u is strictly convex) and does not have maximums. Moreover, assume that the budget function I : R n + → R + is C 1 -smooth, positively homogeneous of degree one, and there exists C > 0 such that I(p) ≥ C|p| for all p ∈ R n + .
When buying a set of goods y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ R n + , the consumer purchases y 1 units of the first good, y 2 units of the second good, etc. The consumer's goal is to maximize his utility function, that is, to solve the following extremum problem:
The consumer's demand is presented by the mapping
If for a given p there exists i such that D i (p) > S i (p), then there is deficit of the ith good at the market. On the contrary, if there exists i such that D i (p) < S i (p), then there is surplus of the ith good. Neither of the situations is satisfactory, since consumer's (respectively, producer's) interests are violated. Thus, the best situation is described by the equality S(p) = D(p).
THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM PRICES
Consider the model of economic equilibrium described by the following data:
1 -smooth function, positively homogeneous of degree one. Here c 1 = (c 11 , . . . , c n1 ), c 2 = (c 12 , . . . , c n2 ) ∈ R n + are given vectors satisfying the condition c i1 < c i2 , i = 1, n.
The set (α, ϕ, u, I) uniquely defines the demand functions
and the supply functions
The numbers α i ∀i = 1, n characterize the transaction costs of producers. The components of the vectors c 1 , c 2 determine natural constrains for the prices of goods:
By Σ denote the set of σ = (α, ϕ, u, I, c 1 , c 2 ) satisfying the inequalities c i2 > c i1 , i = 1, n. We shall further assume that σ ∈ Σ.
+ is called the equilibrium price vector in the model σ.
For x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n consider the norms
For a linear operator G : R n → R n define the norms
[c i1 ; c i2 ], be the solution of the extremum problem
y be the solution of the extremum problem (4) with p = c 1 + c 2 , and (ȳ + ,ȳ − ) be the solution of the extremum problem
where λ i (y + ; y − ), i = 1, 2n, andλ i (y), i = 1, n, are the eigenvalues of the matrices ϕ (y + ; y − ) and u (y), respectively, and
Theorem 2. Suppose that the model σ ∈ Σ satisfies the following conditions:
Then the model σ possesses the equilibrium price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) such that c i1 < p i < c i2 , i = 1, n.
AUXILIARY RESULTS
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on some auxiliary results. Let X and Y be metric spaces with the metrics ρ X and ρ Y , respectively. By B X (c, r) (B Y (c, r)) denote the closed ball in the space X (respectively, Y ) with the center c and radius r.
Theorem 4 (about coincidence points, Arutyunov [9] ). Let X be a complete metric space, D : X → Y be a continuous α-covering mapping, S : X → Y be a Lipschitz continuous mapping with the Lipschitz constant β < α. Then for any x 0 ∈ X, there exists ξ = ξ(x 0 ) ∈ X such that
The solution ξ of equation (5) is called the coincidence point of the mappings D and S. It is worth observing that the coincidence point is not necessarily unique.
From Theorem 4, it follows (see Arutyunov [9] ) the Milyutin theorem about perturbation of covering mappings.
Theorem 5 (about perturbation). Let X be a complete metric space, Y be a normed vector space, and D : X → Y be a continuous α-covering mapping. Then for every Lipschitz continuous mapping S : X → Y with the Lipschitz constant β < α, the mapping
Let M ⊂ X be an arbitrary nonempty set.
By cov(D| M ) denote the supremum of α > 0 such that the mapping D is α-covering on M . If M = X, denote the supremum by cov(D).
Theorem 7 (Arutyunov et al. [8] ). Let X be a complete metric space, x 0 ∈ X, α > 0, R > 0, and D : X → Y be a closed mapping, α-covering on B X (x 0 , R). Let S : B X (x 0 , R) → Y be a Lipschitz continuous mapping with the Lipschitz constant β < α such that
Then there exists the coincidence point ξ ∈ X of the mappings D and S, i.e.,
It is worth observing that in the economic model considered above, the equilibrium price vector is the coincidence point of the demand and supply functions.
To establish sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium price vector, consider the following two extremum problems. The first problem is
Here the optimization proceeds with respect to the variable y ∈ R k , while the variable x ∈ R k plays the role of parameter. Assume that the function ϕ : R k → R, which presents the constrains, is C 2 -smooth and strongly convex, i.e., there exists ε > 0 such that the matrix ϕ (y) − εE is positive definite for every y. Moreover, assume that there existsȳ ∈ R k : ϕ(ȳ) < 0. Let · be an arbitrary norm in the space R k .
Lemma 8. For every x = 0, the extremum problem (6) has a unique solution y = y(x), which is C 1 -smooth in the domain x = 0 and
Here
and the symbol " * " means the transpose.
Proof. The Lagrange function for the extremum problem (6) reads
By hypothesis, the set {y : ϕ(y) ≤ 0} is nonempty, compact and strictly convex. A linear function attains a unique maximum on a strictly convex compact. Therefore, for every x = 0, the extremum problem (6) has a unique solution y = g(x).
Since the function ϕ is strongly convex, the following regularity condition holds:
Therefore, taking into account the Lagrange principe, we conclude that there exist λ ≥ 0 such that
Let us introduce mapping F :
Then the relations (10) are equivalent to the equation
with the parameter x and the unknowns (y, λ). Let us show that this equation satisfies the conditions of the implicit function theorem with respect by (y, λ), that is, the matrix ∂F ∂(y,λ) (x, y, λ) is non-degenerate. Indeed, using the notations (8) and taking into account (10), for all
It suffices to prove that for every w, w k+1 the linear system
has a solution v, v k+1 . By the assumptions made above λ > 0, the matrix Ψ is positive definite (and consequently, nondegenerate) and ψ = 0. The system (12) can be written in the form
Therefore, we have λΨv = −w − ψ * v k+1 , and consequently,
Substituting the obtained expression for v in the second equality in (13), we get
In view of what we have said above, ψ * , (λΨ) −1 ψ * > 0. Hence this yields
Substituting the obtained expression for v k+1 in (14), we get
Thus, the obtained pair v, v k+1 is a solution of (12), and the matrix
From what we have said above, it follows that the solution v, v k+1 can be represented in the form
,
This gives the following formula for the inverse matrix:
Consequently, for every x = 0, equation (11) has the solution (y, λ)(x). Moreover, this solution is unique, since in the maximization problem (6) the Lagrange principle is sufficient condition for maximum, the maximum point is unique, and (in light of the regularity condition (9)) the corresponding Lagrange multiplier λ is uniquely defined. By the implicit function theorem, the mapping (y, λ)(·) is C 1 -smooth in the domain x = 0. Differentiating the identity F (x, (y, λ)(x)) ≡ 0 by x, we get
Taking into account (15) and the obvious identity
Taking into account the equality ψ = x/λ (which follows from (8) and (10), we finally obtain (7).
Consider the second extremum problem u(y) → max, x, y ≤ I(x), y ≥ 0.
Here the optimization proceeds with respect to the variable y ∈ R k + , while the variable
plays the role of parameter, c i > 0 are given numbers. Assume that the function I : R k + → R + is C 1 -smooth, positively homogeneous of degree one, and there exists C > 0 such that I(x) ≥ C|x| for all x ∈ R n + . Assume that the function u : R k → R is strongly concave C 2 -smooth function (i.e., the matrix u (y) is negative definite for all y) and does not have maximums. Hence, the set of admissible points {y ∈ R k + : x, y ≤ I(x)} is closed, convex and bounded uniformly with respect to x ∈ X c . Extremum problem (16) consists of maximization of a strictly concave function on a convex compact, hence, for any x, it has a unique solution y = f (x). Taking into account further applications of extremum problem (16), we assume that the function u satisfies the conditions such that f (x) > 0 and x, f (x) = I(x) for every x ∈ X c . Lemma 9. For x ∈ X c , problem (16) has a unique solution y = f (x), where the function f is C 1 -smooth and
whereΨ = u (y),ψ = u (y).
Proof. The Lagrange function of the problem (16) reads
L(x, y, λ) = −u(y) + λ( x, y − I(x)).
By the Lagrange principle, there exists the Lagrange multiplier λ ≥ 0 such that
Let us introduce mapping Φ :
Then the relations (18) are equivalent to
with unknowns (y, λ) and parameter x. Let us show that equation (19) satisfies the conditions of the implicit function theorem, that is, the matrix ∂Φ ∂(y,λ) (x, y, λ) is non-degenerate. Remark that for every x ∈ R k , y ∈ R k and λ ∈ R, from (18) it follows
Let us prove that for every w, w k+1 , the linear system
has solution v, v k+1 . From what we have said above, it follows that the matrixΨ is negative definite (consequently, non-degenerate) and x = 0.
Reasoning analogously to what has gone in Lemma 9, one can write the linear system in the form
Hence, we getΨv = w + x * v k+1 . This yields
Substituting the obtained expression for v in the second equality in (21), we get
In view of what we have said above, x * ,Ψ −1 x * < 0. Hence, this yields
Substituting the obtained expression for v k+1 in (22), we get
Thus, the obtained pair v, v k+1 is a solution of (20), and the matrix
This yields the formula for the inverse matrix:
Consequently, for every x = 0, equation (19) has the solution (y, λ)(x). Moreover, this solution is unique, since in the maximization problem (16), the Lagrange principle is a sufficient condition for maximum, the maximum point is unique, and (in light of the regularity condition (9)) the corresponding Lagrange multiplier λ is uniquely defined. By the implicit function theorem, the mapping (y, λ)(·) is C 1 -smooth in the domain x = 0. Differentiating the identity Φ(x, (y, λ)(x)) ≡ 0 by x, we get
Taking into account (23), the equality
and the equality λ = u (y) · x −1 (which follows from (18)), we finally obtain (17).
For the proof of the main theorem, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 10. Let H be a symmetric positive or negative definite matrix of the order k with the eigenvalues λ i , i = 1, k. Given non-zero vector h = (h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h k ) ∈ R k , define the linear operator H : R k → R k by the formula
We wish to emphasize that the estimation (25) does not depend on h.
Proof. Since a symmetric matrix can be brought to the diagonal form by using an orthogonal transformation, there exists an orthogonal matrix T such that H = T −1 ZT , where Z = diag {λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ k }. Using the equalities H = H * = T −1 ZT and T −1 = T * (orthogonality), one can transform the matrix from the right-hand side of (24) in the following way:
where z * = T h * . Let us estimate the norm H 2 . Since the Euclidean norm of a vector (and consequently, the corresponding norm of a linear operator) does not change, from (26) it follows that it suffices to prove the estimation (25) for the operator H, given by the formula (24) with
It is convenient to represent the operator H in the form
where
Obviously,
Then, taking into account that the matrix H is positive or negative definite, and consequently, its eigenvalues have the same sign, we have
This yields (25).
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Consider the metric spaces (X, For every p ∈ intM , we have
Therefore, by Lemma 8, for every p ∈ intM , we have 
Consequently, by Lemma 10, we have
Now let us estimate cov(D| M ). By Theorem 4 ([Arutyunov et al. [8] ]), we have
By Lemma 9, for p ∈ intM , we have
whereĀ(p),Ā(p) : R n → R n are linear operators given by the following formulaē
. Consequently, by Theorem 5, we obtain the relation
Remark that
since the linear operator with the matrix p * (I (p) − y) acting from R n into R n sends the unit ball centered at the origin to the segment with the endpoints
By Lemma 10, we have
Consequently, taking into account (27), we get
From the by assumption of the theorem and the inequalities cov(D| M ) ≥α(σ), lip(S| M ) ≤β(σ), it follows that there exist positive numbersᾱ andβ such that β(σ) <β <ᾱ <α(σ),γ(σ) <ᾱ −β, the mapping D isᾱ-covering on the set M , and the mapping S is Lipschitz continuous on M with the Lipschitz constantβ.
Since ρ Y (D(c), S(c)) =γ(σ), from the second condition of Theorem 2, it follows that ρ Y (D(c), S(c)) ≤ᾱ −β. Thus, by Theorem 1 ([Arutyunov et al. [8] ]), there exists p ∈ X such that D(p) = S(p) and
From the last inequality, it follows that p ∈ intM . Therefore, c i1 < p i < c i2 for all i = 1, n. The proof is complete.
EXAMPLE
To illustrate the obtained results, let us consider the following example.
Assume that the production capacity of the producer is described by the technology set
where 0 < β < 1, consumer's budget is described by the function
and consumer's preferences are presented by the utility function
The set (α, β, γ, a), where γ = (γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ n ), a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ), uniquely defines the demand and supply functions D :
Then, in the considered model we havẽ
This yields the estimatioñ
, where
Moreover, , ∀i = 1, n.
Then, for the considered model, the condition 1) in Theorem 1 is equivalent to 
By Theorem 2, if the parameters of the model satisfy the conditions (28) and (29), then there exists a equilibrium price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) such that c i1 < p i < c i2 , i = 1, n.
In Table 1 , we present several sets of parameters (for n = 2, c i1 = 0.1, c i2 = 1, i = 1, 2) satisfying the conditions (28), (29), and the corresponding equilibrium prices calculated numerically with precision of 0.001. 
